Wael Nawara

Wael Nawara

Reformasi dan Pancasila, Dua Hal Yang Dapat Kami Pelajari Dari Saudara Kami Bangsa Indonesia”

Indonesia dan Mesir memiliki pengalaman politik yang mirip. Pada tahun 1998, gerakan reformasi telah berhasil menggulingkan rezim despotis Suharto yang berkuasa selama 33 tahun. Tahun 2012, rakyat Mesir pun berhasil menggulingkan rezim diktator Husni Mubarak yang telah berkuasa selama 30 tahun. Pada tahun 2014 ini pun, kedua negara sama-sama menyelenggarakan pilpres yang ‘unik’ dalam sejarah masing-masing (Di Mesir, pilpres berlangsung setelah demonstrasi masif menggulingkan Mursi, di Indonesia pilpres berlangsung dengan ‘panas’ karena masifnya kampanye hitam).  Untuk mengetahui apa yang sesungguhnya terjadi dalam proses transisi di Mesir, kami mewawancarai analis politik asal Mesir, Wael Nawara.*  Wawancara dilakukan dalam bahasa Inggris dan versi asli dapat dibaca di bagian akhir.

Berikut ini terjemahannya- bagian kedua. (baca bagian pertama).

LI: Siapa yang mendanai aktivitas IM? Kita mendengar bahwa AS berkali-kali meminta pemerintah Mesir agar melepaskan aktivis IM. Apa anda percaya bahwa AS ada di belakang IM, sebagaimana AS juga di belakang ISIS atau Al Qaida?

WN: Sangat sulit untuk mendapatkan informasi yang akurat tentang keuangan IM karena IM adalah organisasi bawah tanah uang memiliki jaringan bisnis dan amal yang seringkali bersembunyi di balik kepemilikan palsu. IM beroperasi bagaikan sindikat mafia, dalam arti, mereka menyembunyikan aktivitas dan pembukuannya, bahkan dari anggotanya sendiri; dengan mencegah pengawasan internal maupun eksternal.

Satu-satunya informasi yang kami dapatkan adalah dari mantan anggota IM yang telah meninggalkan organisasi itu karena berbagai alasan. Misalnya, Tharwat El Kharabwi yang menulis buku “Secrets of the Temple.” (Rahasia Kuil). IM mendapatkan dana dari berbagai sumber, antara lain dana keanggotaan, donasi, zakat, dll. Tetapi selama bertahun-tahun, IM meraih kekuatan finansial karena akumulasi hasil investasi mereka, yang dijalankan oleh anggota yang setia; merekalah yang dipercaya untuk mengelola aset organisasi. Ikhwan fokus pada upaya meraih pengaruh dalam berbagai sindikat dan serikat pekerja, untuk menarik dana serikat itu kepada perusahaan dan afiliasi bisnis mereka. Misalnya, Ikhwan menguasai Perserikatan Dokter di Mesir selama hampir 30 tahun. Sebenarnya, jumlah dokter Ikhwan yang menjadi anggota serikat itu hanya sedikit, namun mereka sangat terorganisir, loyal, dan disiplin. Sebaliknya, sebagian besar dokter yang menentang Ikhwan justru berkompetisi di antara mereka sendiri sehingga suara mereka (dalam serikat itu) terbelah.

Setelah menguasai Perserikatan Dokter, organisasi itupun digunakan oleh IM untuk berbagai tujuan, mulai dari pengumpulan donasi hingga perekrutan mujahidin. Karat al-Shatter, Wakil Ketua IM, memulai kerajaan bisnisnya dari monopoli IM dalam berbagai perserikatan. Dana berbagai perserikatan itu dialirkan kepada IM. Perserikatan tersebut dimanfaatkan IM untuk mengilfiltrasi masyarakat serta mengontrol masyarakat di akar rumput. IM mengontrol komite ‘Penyelamatan Kemanusiaan’ dalam Perserikatan Dokter. Komite ini lebih merupakan ‘senjata’ dalam operasi rahasia IM dibanding sebagai komite penyelamatan. Menurut penelitan Badan Keamanan Nasional Mesir, komite ini —yang menerima sumbangan dari seluruh penjuru Mesir— didugamentransfer dana kepada organisasi IM internasional, yang kemudian memberikan dana itu kepada para pemimpin IM di Mesir. Komite ‘Penyelamatan Kemanusiaan’ memiliki 300 juta pound Mesir (43 juta dollar) uang tunai berdasarkan laporan terakhirnya.

Keterlibatan IM dalam merekrut dan memobilisasi Mujahidin di Afghanistan dan Eropa timur, juga ditengarai membuat IM menerima dana rahasia dari Arab dan pemerintahan serta agen-agen rahasia negara-negara Barat.

Sebagaimana yang Anda sebutkan, para teoritisi konspirasi menduga bahwa AS ada di belakang IM, dan ISIS dan Al-Qaida. Mereka mengutip pernyataan-pernyataan pejabat tinggi AS sebagai bukti bagi teori mereka, misalnya, pernyataan mantan Menlu AS, Condoleezza Rice tentang “Kerusuhan Kreatif”. Adalah masuk akalbila IM dan Al Qaida memang melakukan semacam kerjasama dengan CIA dalam beberapa kesempatan, terutama pada era invasi Soviet di Afghanistan tahun 80-an. Apakah kerjasama ini benar-benar ada atau terus berlangsung, masih menjadi perdebatan. Bagaimanapun, alih-alih menyalahkan pihak luar atas kegagalan kita, pendekatan yang lebih proaktif bisa dilakukan dengan bertanya pada diri kita sendiri:

Apakah IM dan gerakan ideologi-politik Islam sejenisnya telah berkontribusi dalam memperkuat, atau malah memperlemah masyarakat dan negara? Apakah mereka telah membantu kita untuk mencapai kemajuan dan persatuan, atau malah menghancurkan bangunan sosial kita, memecah-belah bangsa, memperlemah bangsa (seperti terjadi di Sudan, Syria, Libya, Irak, Somalia, Afghanistan, Palestina, Aljazair, dll.) dan mengancam keselamatan kita?

Segera setelah kita mendapatkan jawaban, kita dapat memutuskan apa yang perlu dilakukan di masa depan. Tak peduli siapapun yang menanam benih kejahatan dalam masyarakat kami, yang jelas kami sekarang menghadapi tantangan ini dan harus segera bangkit kembali, membangun lagi secara budaya, politik, ekonomi, dan sosial; jika tidak kami akan semakin mundur sambil terus berdebat tentang siapa yang bertanggung jawab atas semua kemalangan ini.

LI: Indonesia memiliki pengalaman yang mirip dengan Mesir. Pada tahun 1998 kami menggulingkan rezim Suharto yang berkuasa 33 tahun. Untunglah setelah itu kami tidak mengalami konflik sebesar yang terjadi di Mesir. Dalam pandangan Anda, apa perbedaan antara ‘reformasi’ Indonesia dan ‘revolusi’ Mesir?

WN: Saya pikir, ada banyak hal yang bisa kami pelajari, bahkan kami harus belajar dari reformasi Indonesia dan juga dari Pancasila. Sebagaimana Indonesia memiliki Pancasila, bangsa Mesir juga perlu mendefinisikan dan menyepakati ideologi Mesir yang inklusifyang akan mengatasi berbagai perbedaan politik.

Juga, agar Revolusi Mesir berhasil, kami harus mengubah segala tuntutan dan perjanjian ke dalam sebuah rencana reformasi.Sebagian revolusiner Mesir berpikir bahwa revolusi hanya terkait dengan demonstrasi dan konfrontasi, teriakan ‘turunkan ini atau itu’. Tetapi hal ini hanya menyampaikan apa yang kamu tidak mau; hanya menyampaikan apa yang ingin kamu hancurkan, enyahkan, atau lenyapkan. Rakyat akan memberikan respon lebih baik terhadap hal-hal yang positif. Kami perlu melakukan perubahan posituf dan tidak sekedar menolak apa yang disukai. Sebagian besar kaum revolusioner, sayangnya, hanya sedikit memikirkan apa yang ingin mereka bangun. Contohnya, hanya sedikit yang terlibat dalam partai politik atau bicara tentang rencana reformasi atau upaya rekonsiliasi.

Mereka lebih fokus pada kasus ‘hukum atau penahanan politik’ yang dilakukan anggota rezim lama (foloul), yang diperluas secara tidak bijak dengan mengorbankan jutaan warga yang tidak melakukan kesalahan apapun. Publik memandang aksi ini lebih sebagai tindakan balas dendam dan posesif terhadap masa lalu, dibanding sebagai upaya untuk maju ke depan dengan spirit rekonsiliasi dan ampunan. Sebuah revolusi akan berhasil baik bila dapat menarik dukungan luas, lebih inklusif, dan memberikan visi untuk membangun masa depan yang lebih baik. Menghancurkan adalah mudah, dan membangun adalah lebih sulit. Mengasingkan dan mengeluarkan, adalah mudah. Tapi, mengajak orang bergabung dan mendamaikan, adalah sulit. Mengkritik orang lain dan menyalahkan pihak luar, konspirasi, atau kekuatan misterius atas kegagalan sendiri adalah mudah. Tapi, yang sulit adalah memperbaiki diri. Saya rasa inilah yang perlu kami lakukan: menyadari bahwa Mesir akan semakin baik, ketika masing-masing warga juga berubah dan melakukan hal-hal kecil yang lebih baik.

Karena itulah, Reformasi Indonesia adalah inspirasi. Reformasi Indonesia mungkin dimulai dengan revolusi, tapi dengan cepat berevolusi menjadi bentuk reformasi dan melakukan perbaikan-perbaikan kecil. Seiring waktu, perbaikan itu terakumulasi seiring terbentuknya institusi, dan berkembangnya budaya serta praktik demokratis. Dalam pandangan saya, ini adalah cara terbaik untuk maju membangun masa depan yang lebih baik.

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Versi asli wawancara

Reformasi and Pancasila, two things we can Learn from our Indonesian Brothers and Sisters
Q:Mr. Nawara what is your comment about our election and our new president?

A:I have read about Mr. Widodo and was most impressed by his“street-politics” style. I had written extensively about “crowd democracy” as a rising trend where growing segments of the public are tremendouslyempowered such that they shape the future of their society. A clever leaderbecomes a “follower-leader”, always listening to what I call the “collective mind” or the “connected mind” to harness the “wisdom of the crowds.”

According to the KPU, Mr. Joko Widodo is Indonesia’s next president with53.15 percent of the vote against Prabowo Subianto’s 46.85 percent in theJuly 9 election. In a Western democracy, this may be a comfortable majority. But I think Mr. Widodo will probably have to reach out to hisopponent’s camp and try to unite the country and build consensus on hispolicies especially with the unfortunate situation where Mr. Subianto seems to be rejecting the results.

I wish Mr. Widodo and Indonesian people well — and hope that as the newpresident, Mr. Widodo will be able to unite the country and lead the pathto achieving everything that the people wish for.

Q: You wrote that “collective mind of Egyptians who see this as an opportunity to fix the country’s affairs while there is a popular and strong president.” And al-Sisi has been elected as president. In a democratic society, military is not supposed to be a president. Can we say that the Egyptian is not ready for the genuine democracy yet?

A: This is a misconception. Many American presidents came from Military background. Eisenhower, the 34th President of the United States who ruled from 1953 until 1961, was a five-star general in the United States Army during World War II and served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe. He led the invasion of North Africa in Operation Torch in 1942–43 and the successful invasion of France and Germany in 1944–45 from the Western Front. In 1951, he became the first supreme commander of NATO. Undoubtedly, his military record was a contributing factor in why the American people voted for him. Similarly, many Egyptians felt that Al Sisi is the best man to take the helm at these difficult times and urged him to run for president. As a result, Al Sisi retired from the military, ran in the elections and won.

Q: Mr. Nawara, you wrote that  “A terrorist group might even target Sisi himself, who said in a televised interview that two attempts on his life were uncovered.” What is El Sisi’s commitment toward terrorism (not only Moslem Brotherhood, but also terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda like ISIS)?

A: Al Sisi have made many announcements which demonstrate his commitment to fighting terrorist groups operating inside Egypt such as Ansarbeit Al Maqdis and AgnadMasr. He also made comments that Egypt will support Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia and Gulf States in fighting terrorist groups. I think this should be translated into some formal Arab Defense Alliance (similar to NATO for example), to turn these ideas and intentions into concrete security arrangements which can be effective on the ground.

Q: You wrote that “The Muslim Brotherhood usually gains many votes by massive mobilization during elections. With the group designated as a terrorist organization and thousands of its leaders in jail, its command structure, funding and logistical capacity are severely weakened.” It seems that MB was very popular di Egypt (we also heard that they have many social activities dan give many social service to the people), so why it was so easy for the Egypt people to turn their back against MB?

A: Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity was always limited. Despite the Brotherhood’s vast financial resources, skilled and experienced election machine, international affiliations, organizational capacity, command structure, syndicate power and network of charities, former president Mohamed Morsi only got around 5.5 million votes (25% of the votes – or 12% of the total votes) in the first round of 2012 Presidential Elections. Prior to 2011 Revolution, the regime in Egypt only had two major parties: National Democratic Party (NDP), which was the ruling party, chaired by Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which was an illegal entity, yet allowed by Mubarak’s regime to engage in politics, economics, unions, charities and so on. After 2011 Revolution, the NDP was dissolved. That left the Muslim Brotherhood as the only organized political entity on the scene. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which became the “care taker” of the transition following Mubarak’s removal, allowed the Brotherhood to form a legitimate political party, Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).

Egyptian voters picked from choices available. The Brotherhood presented themselves strongly in the following elections and many Egyptians (as well as SCAF) decided to give them a chance. The Brotherhood, however, became too greedy for their own good. They tried to monopolize the political scene although they only had limited popular support, which led to an unstable position. In a democracy, if a political party has a small majority (for instance 25%, which is the amount of votes which Morsi got in the first round of 2012 presidential elections), it seeks to have an alliance or coalition, which entails compromises and power-sharing arrangements. The Brotherhood wanted to control it all according to the “Tamkeen” or Empowerment Plan and this led to their demise.

It became clear to many Egyptians that the Brotherhood wanted to “hijack” their country, change its cultural identity and annex it to the Brotherhood’s global dominance enterprise (Ostaziat El Alem). The Brotherhood revealed itself not as an Egyptian political party pursuing an Egyptian agenda, but as an international organization seeking to have Egypt as a strategic foothold to expand its rule, wealth and power regionally and globally.

By May 2013, both Gallup and Baseera opinion polls showed collapse of public support to Morsi. On June 30th, 2013 mass demonstrations demanded Morsi’s resignation and early presidential elections.

Instead of learning from their mistakes, the Brotherhood turned to violence and attempted to push the country into a civil war, often on sectarian sentiments which Egyptians did not respond to. The Brotherhood occupied and fortified several sites in Cairo, Giza and some other governorates. They and their allies adopted a scorched earth strategy, waging a chain of attacks on Egyptian police and military personnel and installations, government facilities, churches and civilians in Cairo, Giza, Assuit, Sinai and other areas around the country. After months of confrontations, the Brotherhood was declared as a terrorist organization.

Q:  Who funds theactivities of MB? We heard that US keep calling the Egypt government to release the MB activists.Do you believe that United States behind MB, as US also behind ISIS or Al Qaida?

A: It is very difficult to accurately get information related to MB finances since it is an underground organization owning an entangled web of businesses and charities often hiding behind façade owners and dummy structures. The Brotherhood operates like the Mafia or any crime organization, which means it hides and disguises its activities and books even from its own members preventing external or even internal governance, public or private scrutiny.

The only information we get is from former members of the Brotherhood who left the organization for one reason or another, such as Tharwat El Kharabwi who authored the book “Secrets of the Temple.” The Brotherhood raises funds from variety of sources such as members’ subscriptions, donations, Zakat (Alimony) and so on. But over the years, the Brotherhood gained financial power as it accumulated proceeds of its own investments in operations often run by faithful members with whom the Brotherhood entrusted to manage the organizations assets. The Brotherhood also focused on gaining influence in syndicates and unions to siphon union funds to its companies and affiliated businesses. For instance, the Brotherhood controlled the Doctors’ Union in Egypt for almost 30 years with a small number of Brotherhood doctors who were well–organized, loyal and disciplined while the vast majority of the doctors opposing the Brotherhood competed amongst themselves often fragmenting their votes.

Once controlled, the Doctors Syndicate in Egypt, was used by the Brotherhood in a variety of purposes — from fundraising to recruiting of mujaheddin. Karat al-Shatter, deputy leader of the Brotherhood, started his business empire from the lucrative monopoly the Brotherhood’s control over unions awarded him over organizing “Durable and Appliances Expose” to members of various syndicates. Union funds were siphoned by the Brotherhood and the syndicates were used to infiltrate and control society at grassroots level. The Muslim Brotherhood controlled the “Humanitarian Relief” committee in the Doctors Syndicate. The committee became yet another arm for the Brotherhood clandestine operations rather than a humanitarian body. According to National Security Agency’s investigations, the committee — which received donations from all over Egypt — would allegedly transfer funds to the Brotherhood’s International organization, which would in turn redirect the money to the Brotherhood leaders in Egypt. The “Relief Committee” had 300 million Egyptian pounds ($43 million) in cash according to its last report.

Brotherhood involvement in recruiting and mobilizing Mujahidin in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe also allegedly enabled the organization to receive undisclosed financial support from Arab and Western governments and Intelligence Agencies.

As you mention in your question, Conspiracy Theorists suggest that the US is behind the Brotherhood, as well as ISIS and Al-Qaida. They use quotations from top US policy makers such as Condoleezza Rice about “Creative Chaos” as evidence supporting their theories. It is plausible that the Brotherhood and Al Qaida had some sort of cooperation with US Intelligence Agencies in several occasions especially during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in the 80s. Whether this cooperation continued or seized to exist is a matter for speculation. However, instead of pinning our own failures on external forces, a more proactive approach would entail that we ask ourselves:

Has the Brotherhood and Islamist political ideology contributed to strengthening – or weakening – our societies and states? Has it helped us progress and become advanced and united, or has it ruptured our social fabric, divided our States weakened our States (such as Sudan, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Palestine, Algeria, etc.)and now threatens our very survival?

Once we get the answer, we can decide what to do in the future. Regardless of who planted these evil seeds in our societies, we must now face this challenge and quickly recover culturally, politically, economically and socially, or else face extinction while we argue about who is responsible for our own misfortunes.

Q: Indonesia had the same experience with Egypt. In 1998 we overthrow a 33-year-regime, Suharto. Fortunately, we didn’t have any big crisis –like what happened in Egypt–after that. In your opinion, what is the difference between Indonesian ‘reformation’ and Egypt ‘revolution’ ?

A: I think there are many things we could have learned; in fact we must now learn, from the Indonesian Reformasi and also Indonesian Pancasila. Similar to Indonesian Pancasila, Egyptians need to define and agree on an inclusive Egyptian Ideology which transcends political differences.

Also, in order for the Egyptian Revolution to be successful, it must turn its demands and ideals into a reform plan. Some Egyptian revolutionaries thought that the revolution is only about demonstrations and confrontations, chants of “down with” this or that. But these things only tell what you do not want. They express what you want to knock down, remove or abolish. But people respond more to positive things. We need to pursue positive change and not just reject things we do not like. Most revolutionaries sadly spent little effort talking about what they wanted to “build.” For instance, very few engaged in political parties or talked about reform plans or reconciliation efforts. Most would focus on “legal or political incarceration” of former regime members (foloul), a term which revolutionaries unwisely expanded to exclude millions of Egyptians who had done nothing wrong. To the public, this seemed to be indulging into revenge and being possessed with the past rather than looking ahead to the future with a spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness.

A revolution can best succeed when it can attract wide support, become more inclusive and present a vision to build a better future. It is always easy to destroy, yet more difficult to build. Easy to alienate and exclude. Often more difficult to include and reconcile. Easy to criticize others and pin one’s own failures on some external factors, conspiracies or mysterious forces. More difficult to improve oneself. I think this is what we need to do. To realize that Egypt will improve, when each of us changes and improves little things. Indonesian Reformasi, is therefore inspiring. It may have started with a revolution, but it quickly went into an evolution of reforms and small improvements, which with time accumulated as institutions were built and a democratic culture and practices evolved. In my humble view, this is the best way to go forward building a better future.[]

 

*Wael Nawara adalah penulis dan aktivis Mesir. Dia salah satu pendiri Partai Al Dostor Asosiasi Nasional untuk Perubahan dan Partai El Ghad. Pernah menjadi Presiden Aliansi Arab untuk Kebebasan dan Demokrasi, dan merupakan fellow di Institut Politik, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.*

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